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Recent proposals to compensate developing countries for reducing emissions from deforestation
(RED) under forthcoming climate change mitigation regimes are receiving increasing attention.
Here we demonstrate that if RED credits were traded on international carbon markets, even
moderate decreases in deforestation rates could generate billions of Euros annually for tropical forest
conservation. We also discuss the main challenges for a RED mechanism that delivers real climatic
beneﬁts. These include providing sufﬁcient incentives while only rewarding deforestation reductions
beyond business-as-usual scenarios, addressing risks arising from forest degradation and
international leakage, and ensuring permanence of emission reductions. Governance may become
a formidable challenge for RED because some countrieswith the highest RED potentials score poorly
on governance indices. In addition to climate mitigation, RED funds could help achieve substantial
co-beneﬁts for biodiversity conservation and human development. However, this will probably
require targeted additional support because the highest biodiversity threats and human development
needs may exist in countries that have limited income potentials from RED. In conclusion, how
successfully a market-based RED mechanism can contribute to climate change mitigation,
conservation and development will strongly depend on accompanying measures and carefully
designed incentive structures involving governments, business, as well as the conservation and
development communities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Deforestation in the tropics accounts for up to 20% of
global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), making it
the second most important contributor to climate
change after the combustion of fossil fuels and the
largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
the developing world (Houghton 2005). Despite this,
the current framework under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol does not contain
any mechanism to reward efforts aimed at avoided
deforestation in developing countries. At present, the
possibilities to gain carbon credits from forestry
activities under the clean development mechanism
(CDM) remain limited to afforestation and reforesta-
tion projects (UNFCCC 2001).
The debate has recently gained new momentum,
however, with proposals to compensate developing
countries that succeed in reducing emissions from
deforestation (RED) with ﬁnancial incentives, such as
tradable carbon credits (Laurance 2007). The concept
would most likely involve countries lowering deforesta-
tion rates below a national historical baseline, and a
novel mechanism could be included in a post-2012
Kyoto regime (Santilli et al. 2005; UNFCCC 2005a).
Crediting emission reductions on a national rather than
on a project level would have the major advantage of
accounting for in-country ‘carbon leakage’ which
occurs when deforesting activities are simply displaced
rather than avoided (Aukland et al. 2003). RED would
thereby address one of the major objections raised in
past policy discussions against including avoided
deforestation under the CDM.
Globally, the Amazon stands out as the region with
the greatest potential to contribute to climate change
mitigation through RED. Between 1990 and 2005, all
Amazon countries combined accounted for approxi-
mately 26% (3.7 Mha) of global deforestation (table 1;
FAO 2001, 2006). Moreover, high average forest
carbon densities make this ﬁgure translate into 46%
of related global carbon emissions. For example, Brazil
ranks among the world’s top GHG emitters worldwide
when emissions from deforestation are taken into
account (UNFCCC 2005b).
Reducing deforestation would signiﬁcantly reduce
global GHG emissions and markets for RED carbon
credits could be substantial. However, in order to
translate this potential into actual climate beneﬁts,
several critical issues must be addressed by a future
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RED to generate funds through international carbon
markets and discusses four key issues that are currently
debated by scientists and policy makers. In addition,
we explore to what extent RED may generate
biodiversity and development co-beneﬁts. Technical
questions regarding carbon measurements and the
monitoring of land-use change will not be discussed,
since there is a general scientiﬁc consensus that these
can be resolved pragmatically with existing technology
and that uncertainties can be addressed through
conservative carbon accounting approaches.
2. CARBON FINANCE FOR AVOIDED
DEFORESTATION
Linking RED to international carbon markets could
create a real opportunity to tackle an important source
of GHG emissions at comparably low costs and could
overcome the funding constraints that have hampered
forestconservationformanyyears(Balmford&Whitten
2003; Laurance 2007). International funding for
forestry totalled approximately US$1.1 billion annually
during the last decade with expenditures for forest
protection probably being much lower (Tomaselli
2006). In comparison, international carbon markets
transacted V9.5 billion (US$14.1 billion) in 2005, the
yearwhentheKyotoProtocolenteredintoforce,aﬁgure
that soared to V22.5 billion (US$33.3 billion) in 2006
andisprojectedtocontinuetoincrease(Hasselknippe&
Røine 2007).
To evaluate the potential scale of conservation
carbon ﬁnance created through RED, we computed a
range of estimates using existing reported data on
annual deforestation rates between 1990 and 2005 for
all countries with a net forest area loss during this
period (FAO 2006) and country-speciﬁc values of
average forest carbon content (IPCC 2003). We then
factored in potential decreases in deforestation rates
and a range of carbon prices (V5–30/tCO2) recently
observed on international markets. Using these
assumptions, reducing deforestation rates by as little
as 10% globally could generate substantial annual
carbon ﬁnance (V1.5–9.1 billion, or US$2.2–13.5
billion; ﬁgure 1).
3. SETTING FAIR AND REALISTIC BASELINES
Under a future RED scheme, carbon credits would be
created based on a comparison of current deforestation
rates and a business-as-usual (BAU) or ‘baseline’
scenario. This gives the setting of baselines a crucial
role in deﬁning both the monetary incentives for
individual countries and the environmental integrity
of generated carbon credits. In the discussions to date,
the favoured approach has been to deﬁne baselines as a
multi-year average of historical deforestation rates.
This approach would favour countries with high
historical deforestation rates, for example, Brazil or
Ecuador. In contrast, countries which have maintained
a very high forest cover, for example, Guyana or
Suriname, or have already succeeded in lowering or
even reversing deforestation trends in the past, for
example, Chile or Costa Rica, would gain very little
from RED.
Such seemingly inequitable approaches to calcu-
lating baselines could jeopardize political support for
RED from countries with a good deforestation track
record. In addition, incorrectly assuming deforestation
rates to remain high while they are in fact improving
under the BAU scenario would create ‘hot air’ by
rewarding reductions in GHG emissions that would
have occurred anyway. A number of countries demon-
strate ‘forest transitions’ (Rudel et al. 2005), trends of
decreasing deforestation rates over time, which may
eventually reverse into increases in forest cover, owing
to the shifts in labour markets and demands for
environmental services from forests associated with
economic development. On the other end of the
spectrum, in some countries, low historical deforesta-
tion rates could rapidly change under a realistic BAU
scenario as land-use conversion pressures increase with
economic and demographic growth. In this case, RED
schemes could fail to provide sufﬁcient economic
incentives to prevent emission increases. It is note-
worthy that similar challenges existed in negotiating
baselines for the current Kyoto Protocol, for example,
Table 1. Deforestation in Amazon countries (member states
of ACTO) 1990–2005. (Source: FAO (2001, 2006)).
country
average annual change in forest area
absolute (ha) relative (%)
Bolivia K270 000 K0.45
Brazil K2 821 670 K0.55
Colombia K47 670 K0.10
Ecuador K198 000 K1.60
Guyana (0) (0.00)
Peru K94 000 K0.10
Suriname (0) (0.00)
Venezuela K288 000 K0.60
total K3 719 340 K0.20
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Figure 1. Scenarios for potential global market value of RED
credits at variable carbon prices and reductions in deforesta-
tion rates. Bars display global potential market value, and
diagonal lines represent the contributions of Amazon
countries. Carbon price V/tCO2: open bars, 5; grey bars, 15
and black bars, 30.
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USA and Japan, or the BAU decrease in emissions
through the economic collapse in East Germany
(Depledge 2000).
4. ACCOUNTING FOR EMISSIONS FROM
DEGRADATION
To measure and monitor deforestation, countries must
agree on a threshold value distinguishing forests from
non-forest land. Under the Kyoto Protocol, forests are
deﬁned as lands with more than 10–30% crown cover.
However, many activities such as selective logging can
degrade forests without causing signiﬁcant changes to
crown cover that could be detected by most types of
remote sensing technology (DeFries et al. 2005).
Consequently, even if there are no net changes in
forested area, there could be signiﬁcant carbon losses.
Asner et al. (2005) estimated that emissions from land-
use conversions in the Amazon are 25% greater when
forest degradation is included. Degradation could thus
undermine the climatic beneﬁts of RED while further-
more threatening biodiversity.
Many scientists have therefore argued for a
mechanism aimed at reducing emissions from defor-
estation and degradation (REDD). Unfortunately,
while most experts agree that forest area changes can
be monitored sufﬁciently well with existing technology,
it is much more challenging to estimate carbon stock
changes from forest degradation (DeFries et al. 2007).
However, rather than delaying the start of a scheme
until suitable technologies are developed and deployed,
pragmatic approaches can be implemented. For
example, Achard et al. (2005) propose to simply
discount the carbon values of non-intact forests when
issuing REDD credits. Depending on available data for
a country, a variable number of categories could be
used to account for the severity of degradation and to
assign respective REDD discounts. In addition,
signiﬁcant advances in remote sensing technology are
underway (DeFries et al. 2007; Kintisch 2007)a n d
targeted support for research and development, as well
as technology transfer to REDD host countries could
soon allow for more accurate measurements of carbon
losses from forest degradation.
5. PERMANENCE OF EMISSION REDUCTIONS
Permanence of emission reductions was a major
controversial issue during earlier climate negotiations
regarding the inclusion of forests as carbon sinks in the
Kyoto Protocol. The concern was that if a newly
created sink is burnt or logged, the sequestered carbon
will be released back into the atmosphere and there will
be no net emission reduction (Ebeling in press). In
contrast, emissions reduced by implementing a fuel
switch or an energy efﬁciency measure will have a
permanent impact. For example, even if a solar power
plant goes out of service and an old oil-ﬁred power
station is reinstated, the emissions that have been
avoided by the solar power plant will not become
undone (Chomitz 2002).
When comparing the non-permanence issue of
forest plantations to avoided deforestation, there is
one crucial difference. Conserving forests decreases a
source of emissions, rather than creating a sink.
Emissions from deforestation are thus not inherently
different from emissions created through the combus-
tion offossil fuels, at least in the context of large carbon
pools, such as the Amazon forest or remaining global
oil reserves. Protecting carbon stocks in existing forests
now can mean that the stored CO2 is emitted later,
thereby merely delaying emissions from a deﬁned
source—but the same argument can be made for fossil
fuels. In fact, a time delay in emissions through
temporary abatement measures results in permanent
climate beneﬁts because the cumulative atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs will be lower at any future
point in time (ﬁgure 2).
There is an additional beneﬁt of temporary forest
protection measures if they coincide with national
level forest transitions. In countries with decreasing
deforestation rates forests which are conserved through
‘temporary’ conservation measures could face lower
conversion pressure once these measures terminate
and could remain permanently conserved. Some
concerns remain about the possibility of large deforest-
ation ‘rebounds’ above previous levels if countries
abandoned RED policies (Laurance 2007), although
thisscenariomayberatherhypothetical(Ebeling2006).
Mechanisms such as banking a percentage of RED
creditsasanassuranceforfuturedeforestationincreases
could accommodate this concern. In contrast, any
legally binding commitments resulting from RED
crediting to maintain certain land areas under forest
cover in perpetuity or lock in deforestation rates for the
longer-term future are likely to be perceived by some
countries as an infringement of sovereignty over their
natural resources (Laurance 2007).
Another type of permanence risk could arise from a
positive climatic feedback effect. One study predicted
hightemperaturerisesandprecipitationdecreasesacross
the Amazon region (Cox et al. 2000), engendering fears
t1
RA
t2 time t*
time in which deforestation
is delayed (temporary
conservation)
GHG
emissions
(cumulative) RB
Figure 2. Cumulative effect of temporary and permanent
emission abatement. Over time, additional emissions increase
the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. The solid black line
represents the BAU scenario, whereas the dotted lines
represent an abatement scenario where annual emissions
are reduced through activities such as forest conservation at
t
1. Even if the mitigation measure ends at t
2, there is a lasting
reduction (RA) in the amount of emissions at t
, albeit
smaller than if the abatement measure had continued (RB).
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and ﬁre risks. However, modelling uncertainties of this
and similar studies are substantial, not least because
results depend on hardly predictable human activities
and complex feedback loops. The Amazon has been
remarkably resilient to past rapid climate change, and
lowland Amazon forest cover remained largely intact
even during Pleistocenic glacial periods (Colinvaux et al.
2000). Furthermore, predicted regional climatic
changes in the Amazon region are likely to be patchy
and not unidirectional, making a similarly variable
ecological response probable. A number of papers in
this volume allow further assessment of the likelihood of
dieback (Betts et al. 2008).
6. INTERNATIONAL LEAKAGE
Ifdeforestationactivitiesmovefromoneregiontoanother
within the same country, this type of ‘within-country
leakage’ would be reﬂected in the same RED accounting
system at the national level and thus become irrelevant in
terms of international carbon crediting. This is one of the
mainadvantagesofusingnational-levelinsteadofproject-
level RED mechanisms. However, a certain potential for
international leakage exists. If only some countries
participated in a regime for reducing deforestation, global
markets might shift supply and demand patterns for
timber or agricultural commodities across borders and
lead to greater deforestation rates in countries not
attemptingtogainREDcredits(Ebelinginpress).During
the design of the Kyoto architecture, similar concerns
were voiced regarding incentives for fossil-fuel based
industrial production to move from industrialized
countries with emission reduction targets to (developing)
countries without targets (Niesten et al. 2002).
Nevertheless, fears of massive international leakagein
theREDcontextseemexaggerated.Reducingdeforesta-
tion does not mean a complete halt offorest conversion.
Countries trying to lower deforestation rates would ﬁrst
target low-cost conservation options such as clearing of
forests on marginally productive soils with low opportu-
nitycosts.Governmentscouldreducedeforestationrates
in these areas by, for example, enforcing existing land
regulations, especially in frontier areas, removing
perverse incentives for land clearing to establish tenure,
and by expanding and enforcing protected areas
and indigenous territories. In many circumstances,
intelligent infrastructure and land-use planning, as well
as improved agricultural productivity, for example,
regarding road construction and cattle farming, would
greatly lower deforestation pressures (Nepstad et al.
2002; Soares-Filho et al. 2006). Thus, it is probable that
highlyproﬁtableventures,suchassoyaagriculture,palm
oilproductionandloggingforvaluabletimber,wouldnot
be strongly affected. These activities frequently involve
internationally mobile actors and international leakage
might indeed occur if countries were to pursue very
ambitious RED targets.
A thorough understanding of the proximate and
ultimate drivers of deforestation in a region or country
(Lambin & Geist 2003) can help estimate the risk of
cross-boundary leakage, and a comprehensive RED
architecture could support leakage prevention activities
in neighbouring countries. Tackling the drivers of
deforestation in a sustainable manner could not only
reduce leakage risks but would also provide an
insurance against future rebounds of deforestation
rates and thereby generate a double beneﬁt for RED
host countries and the global climate. While inter-
national leakage risks can thus be minimized, only full
participation by all tropical forest countries in a RED
regime would completely eliminate them, a fact that
also applies to the broader emission reductions regime
under Kyoto and the UNFCCC.
7. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE
The potential of RED to contribute to climate change
mitigation, achieve co-beneﬁts, and realize monetary
beneﬁts will ultimately depend on how successful
countries actually are in lowering deforestation. This,
in turn, will be inﬂuenced by their ability to, for
example, enforce land-use regulations, improve road
planning, implement payments for ecosystem service
(PES) schemes and restructure incentives for agricul-
ture, that is, by their governance capacity.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between
potential income from RED and national-level govern-
ance indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2005). Data were log
transformed to improve the clarity of the plot. We
weighted income potential by gross domestic product
(GDP) to obtain incentives from RED payments to
governments relativeto the size of a country’s economy.
Many of the countries that could in principle achieve
the highest relative incomes through RED, for
example, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Myanmar, may not have sufﬁciently effective
governance capacities to implement effect land-use
policies. As a result, countries with moderate relative
income beneﬁts and higher governance indices, such as
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Zambia, may be better
positioned to beneﬁt from RED in real terms. In
addition, governance problems are likely to be most
severe at the forest frontier, something not captured by
national-level indicators (Nepstad et al. 2002).
There may thus be formidablechallenges to realizing
RED beneﬁts from a governance perspective. Previous
researchhasfoundthatcountrieswithlowergovernance
scores tend to have higher deforestation rates and less
success in conservation (Smith et al. 2003). Further-
more, even if lower deforestation rates are achieved,
weakgovernancestructuresmaymakeitdifﬁculttopass
on beneﬁts to rural populations, and corrupt govern-
mentagenciesmayshowlittleinterestinsharingbeneﬁts
fairly or support bottom-up conservation initiatives,
thereby diminishing the potential for human develop-
ment co-beneﬁts discussed below. However, from a
more optimistic viewpoint, RED could provide the
necessary incentives and funds to tackle corruption and
improve governance structures which in itself may have
far-reaching indirect beneﬁtsfor povertyalleviationand
environmental protection. For example, policy and
institutional reform in Bolivia’s forestry sector has led
to dramatically reduced corruption in the country’s
forestry agency which has contributed to measurably
improved forest management practices, exempliﬁed
by the country’s leadership role in tropical forest
certiﬁcation (Ebeling & Yasue in press).
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The starting point for RED is climate change
mitigation, and policy makers are mainly concerned
with resolving the types of issues outlined above.
Nevertheless, the topic has met with great interest
among organizations dealing with two other key global
challenges: biodiversity loss and the situation of the
rural poor. Tropical deforestation not only contributes
to climate change but is also regarded as the single
greatest threat to terrestrial biodiversity (Turner 1996).
Conservationists broadly support RED as they antici-
pate biodiversity beneﬁts in line with the funding it
attracts by mitigating climate change (Laurance 2007).
However, carbon markets value carbon not biodiversity
and are designed to focus on the lowest cost options for
generating emission reductions. They will thus favour
areas with low land-use opportunity costs which
may not coincide with areas of high conservation
priorities. For example, global hot spots for biodiversity
conservation have high land-use conversion rates
(Myers et al. 2000) and are consequently likely to
have high opportunity costs for conservation. For such
areas, carbon ﬁnance alone may not be able to
outweigh beneﬁts from alternative land uses.
To evaluate the scope for synergies between RED
and biodiversity conservation on a country level, we
plotted a biodiversity index (Esty et al. 2005) for each
country with net forest area loss from 1990 to 2005
against its relative income potential from RED.
Countries with high index values, representing high
levels of endemism and threatened species, among
other things, did not have high-income potential from
RED. Countries with high-income potential, such as
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, are
not countries of high conservation priorities (see top
right quadrant, ﬁgure 4). Moreover, on a country level,
all Amazonian states are of relatively low biodiversity
conservation priority, presumably because there still
remain many remote, intact forest areas. There are also
biodiversity-rich countries with high levels of biodiver-
sity threats, such as Guyana and Venezuela, which will
probably gain little RED carbon ﬁnance (see bottom
right quadrant, ﬁgure 4). Moreover, countries in arid
regions, which tend to have carbon-poor forests, are
unlikely to draw signiﬁcant beneﬁts from a RED
mechanism, although their forests could be of signi-
ﬁcant biodiversity value. It is important to note that
there could still be signiﬁcant conservation gains in
particular regions within countries that have high-
income potential from RED but score low in national
biodiversity threat indices, for example, the biodiversity
hot spot in the tropical Andes in Bolivia.
There are also widespread hopes that RED will
provide resources for human development and poverty
relief. RED could create monetary value for natural
resources which millions of the world’s poor depend on
for their livelihoods (White & Martin 2002). However,
similarly to biodiversity co-beneﬁts, countries with the
greatest human development needs may not be
countries that have high-income potentials from
RED. In an analysis analogous to the above, we plotted
potential per capita RED ﬁnance against a human
development index (ﬁgure 5). The ﬁndings suggest that
a pure market approach might produce few synergies
between emission reductions through RED and
development beneﬁts on a national level.
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Figure 3. Relationship between income potential (expressed as percentage of GDP, log transformed) and governance.
Governance index used is the mean of two variables measuring law enforcement and corruption perception. Lower values
indicate more severe governance problems (Kaufmann et al. 2005). Filled circle, Amazon countries; triangle, non-Amazon
countries with past net deforestation. None of the countries are located in the top right quadrant of the ﬁgure where high income
potential would coincide with governance levels potentially needed to implement RED schemes effectively.
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conservation and development can be realized through
RED depends on how the mechanism is put into
practice. Compensation payments from an inter-
national mechanism would in all likelihood accrue to
national governments. Whether these payments are
passed on to rural populations and communities can
depend on (i) the mechanisms used to lower deforest-
ation and (ii) the drivers of deforestation that are
targeted. For example, if a country decided to rely
primarily on strict law enforcement to curb deforest-
ation, there would arguably be much fewer develop-
ment beneﬁts than if PES schemes were set up.
Similarly, a government could focus its efforts on a
few players, such as large agro-businesses, rather than
hundreds of thousands of smallholders and forest
communities. Such an approach would probably also
entail lower transaction costs.
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areas and countries that are priorities for conservation
and development by providing supplementary inter-
national funding for RED initiatives which speciﬁcally
aim to enhance non-carbon beneﬁts. For example,
targeted conservation or development co-ﬁnancing
may be able to ‘tip the balance’ in favour of pro-
biodiversity or pro-poor RED activities. Similarly,
conservation organizations with particular experience
in a site or region could provide logistical or advisory
support to encourage RED activities in priority areas. In
addition, some buyers in existing carbon markets are
willing to preferentially buy or pay higher prices for
carbon credits if these are associated with measurable
conservation and development beneﬁts (EcoSecurities
2008; Hamilton et al. 2007). Certiﬁcation standards for
verifying suchimpacts exist and could beeffectively used
to promote co-beneﬁts through RED.
9. CONCLUSIONS
The current political momentum behind the RED
initiative in conjunction with the dynamic negotiations
for a post-2012 climate regime could link tropical forest
conservation with carbon markets, the most progressive
environmental ﬁnance instrument to date. Our analysis
shows that there is a real potential to generate
unprecedented funds for deforestation prevention;
however, it also revealed a number of challenges.
Achieving climatic beneﬁts through RED will depend
on several key design issues of a compensation
mechanism and on striking appropriate trade-offs
between environmental integrity, political and economic
incentives, scientiﬁc rigour and pragmatism regarding
datarequirements.Itwillalsorequireacarefulanalysisof
land-use change dynamics in individual countries.
Crucially, tackling deforestation and implementing
REDwillhingeongovernancecapacityinhostcountries.
Carbon markets alone cannot be expected to overcome
all these hurdles and provide sufﬁcient incentives to
governments and land users on the ground. In addition,
stringent emission targets by industrialized countries are
needed to create a market for RED credits and ensure
thatthesedonotreplaceotheremissionreductionefforts.
Not only may RED reduce harmful GHG emissions
but this mechanism could also provide substantial
co-beneﬁts for biodiversity and human development.
However, achieving these aims may require signiﬁcant
non-carbon-based support, and it is therefore crucial for
conservationists and the development community alike
toengagewithclimatepolicymakersandgovernmentsof
potential RED host countries. Options for improving
co-beneﬁts range from inﬂuencing the international
policy framework regarding the valuation of non-carbon
beneﬁts, to the provision of supplementary funds to
implementREDmeasuresinconservationpriorityareas,
to supporting the choice of pro-poor land-use policies in
host countries. Several decades of experience already
exist in tackling tropical deforestation, identifying and
protecting biodiversity-rich areas, and promoting rural
development (Kramer et al. 1997; Peres & Zimmerman
2001)andtheremaynowbeachancetoimplementmany
lessons in a more supportive political environment and
with more ﬁnancial resources. While it is important not
to raise unrealistic expectations about RED, overcoming
the current challenges offers a historic opportunity of
saving the remaining tropical forests while mitigating
climate change.
REFERENCES
Achard, F., Belward, A. S., Eva, H. D., Federici, S.,
Mollicone, D. & Raes, F. 2005 Accounting for avoided
conversion of intact and non-intact forests—technical options
and a proposal for a policy tool. Brussels, Belgium: Joint
Research Centre of the European Commission.
Asner, G. P., Knapp, D. E., Broadbent, E. N., Oliveira,
P. J. C., Keller, M. & Silva, J. N. 2005 Selective logging in
the Brazilian Amazon. Science 310, 480–482. (doi:10.
1126/science.1118051)
Aukland, L., Moura Costa, P. & Brown, S. 2003 A
conceptual framework and its application for addressing
leakage: the case of avoided deforestation. Clim. Policy 3,
123–136. (doi:10.1016/S1469-3062(02)00065-7)
Balmford, A. & Whitten, T. 2003 Who should pay for tropical
conservation, and how could the costs be met? Oryx 37,
238–250. (doi:10.1017/S0030605303000413)
Betts, R. A., Malhi, Y. & Roberts, J. T. 2008 The future of the
Amazon: new perspectives from climate, ecosystem and
social sciences. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 363, 1729–1735.
(doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0011)
Chomitz, K. M. 2002 Baseline, leakage and measurement
issues: howdo forestryand energy projects compare? Clim.
Policy 2, 35–49. (doi:10.1016/S1469-3062(02)00011-6)
Colinvaux, P. A., De Oliveira, P. E. & Bush, M. B. 2000
Amazonian and neotropical plant communities on glacial
time-scales: the failure of the aridity and refuge
hypotheses. Quat. Sci. Rev. 19, 141–169. (doi:10.1016/
S0277-3791(99)00059-1)
Cox, P. M., Betts, R. A., Jones, C. D., Spall, S. A. &
Totterdell, I. J. 2000 Acceleration of global warming due
to carbon-cycle feedbacks in a coupled climate model.
Nature 408, 184–187. (doi:10.1038/35041539)
DeFries, R., Asner, G., Achard, F., Justice, C., LaPorte, N.,
Price, K., Small, C. & Townshend, J. 2005 Monitoring
tropical deforestation for emerging carbon markets. In
Tropical deforestation and climate change (eds P. Moutinho &
S. Schwartzman), pp. 35–44. Bele ´m, Washington DC:
IPAM, Environmental Defense.
DeFries,R.,Achard,F.,Brown,S.,Herold,M.,Murdiyarso,D.,
Schlamadinger,B.&deSouzaJr,C.2007Earthobservations
forestimatinggreenhousegasemissionsfromdeforestationin
developing countries. Environ. Sci. Policy 10, 385–394.
(doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2007.01.010)
Depledge, J. 2000 Tracing the origins of the Kyoto Protocol:
an article by article textual history. Technical paper
FCCC/TP/2000/2, United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change.
Ebeling, J. 2006 Tropical deforestation and climate change.
Towards an international mitigation strategy. MSc thesis,
Environmental Change Institute, Oxford, UK.
Ebeling, J. In press. Risks and criticism of forestry-based
climate change mitigation and carbon trading. In Forests,
climate change and the carbon market: risks and emerging
opportunities (eds C. Streck, R. O’Sullivan & T. Janson-
Smith). London, UK: Earthscan.
Ebeling, J. & Yasue, M. In press. The effectiveness of market-
based conservation in the tropics: forest certiﬁcation in
Ecuador and Bolivia. J. Environ. Manage.
EcoSecurities 2008 REDD policy scenarios and carbon markets.
A report commissioned by the Government of Indonesia and the
World Bank. Oxford, UK; Jakarta, Indonesia: Indonesian
Forest Carbon Alliance.
Realising beneﬁts of avoided deforestation J. Ebeling & M. Yasue ´ 1923
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2008)Esty, D. C., Levy, M., Srebotnjak, T. & De Sherbinin, A.
2005 Environmental sustainability index: benchmarking
national environmental stewardship. New Haven, IN: Yale
Center for Environmental Law and Policy.
FAO 2001 Global forest resources assessment 2000. Rome,
Italy: FAO.
FAO 2006 Global forest resources assessment 2005. Rome,
Italy: FAO.
Hamilton, K., Bayon, R., Turner, G. & Higgins, D. 2007
State of the voluntary carbon markets 2007. Picking up steam.
Washington, DC; London, UK: The EcoSystem Market-
place, New Carbon Finance.
Hasselknippe, H. & Røine, K. (eds) 2007 Carbon 2007 - A
new climate for carbon trading. Copenhagen: Point Carbon.
Houghton, R. A. 2005 Tropical deforestation as a source
of greenhouse gas emissions. In Tropical deforestation and
climate change (eds P. Moutinho & S. Schwartzman),
pp. 13–22. Bele ´m, Washington, DC: IPAM, Environ-
mental Defense.
IPCC 2003 Good practice guidance for land use, land-use
change and forestry. Kanagawa, Japan.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. 2005 Governance
matters IV: governance indicators for 1996–2004. Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank Institute.
Kintisch, E. 2007 Improved monitoring of rainforests helps
pierce haze of deforestation. Science 316, 536–537.
(doi:10.1126/science.316.5824.536)
Kramer, R., Schaik, C. V., Johnson, J., Kramer, R., Schaik,
C. V. & Johnson, J. 1997 Last stand. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.
Lambin, E. F. & Geist, H. J. 2003 Regional differences in
tropical deforestation. Environment 45, 22–36.
Laurance, W. F. 2007 A new initiative to use carbon trading
for tropical forest conservation. Biotropica 39, 20–24.
(doi:10.1111/j.1744-7429.2006.00229.x)
Myers,N.,Mittermeier,R.A.,Mittermeier,C.G.,daFonseca,
G. A. B. & Kent, J. 2000 Biodiversity hotspots for
conservation priorities. Nature 403,8 5 3 – 8 5 8 .( doi:10.
1038/35002501)
Nepstad, D., McGrath, D., Alencar, A., Barros, A. C.,
Carvalho, G., Santilli, M. & Vera Diaz, M. d. C. 2002
Environment—enhanced: frontier governance in Amazo-
nia. Science 295, 629–631. (doi:10.1126/science.1067053)
Niesten, E., Frumhoff, P. C., Manion, M. & Hardner, J. J. 2002
Designing acarbon marketthatprotectsforestsindeveloping
countries. P h i l .T r a n s .R .S o c .A360, 1875–1888. (doi:10.
1098/rsta.2002.1037)
Peres, C. A. & Zimmerman, B. 2001 Perils in parks or parks
in peril? Reconciling conservation in Amazonian reserves
with and without use. Conserv. Biol. 15, 793–797. (doi:10.
1046/j.1523-1739.2001.015003793.x)
Rudel, T. K., Coomesb, O. T., Moranc, E., Achard, F.,
Angelsene, A., Xuf, J. & Lambin, E. 2005 Forest
transitions: towards a global understanding of land use
change. Glob. Environ. Change 15, 23–31. (doi:10.1016/
j.gloenvcha.2004.11.001)
Santilli, M., Moutinho, P., Schwartzman, S., Nepstad, D.,
Curran, L. & Nobre, C. 2005 Tropical deforestation and
the Kyoto Protocol. Clim. Change 71, 267–276. (doi:10.
1007/s10584-005-8074-6)
Smith, R. J., Muir, R. D. J., Walpole, M. J., Balmford, A. &
Leader-Williams, N. 2003 Governance and the loss of
biodiversity. Nature 426, 67–70. (doi:10.1038/nature
02025)
Soares-Filho, B. S. et al. 2006 Modelling conservation in the
Amazon basin. Nature 440, 520–523. (doi:10.1038/
nature04389)
Tomaselli, I. 2006 Brief study on funding and ﬁnance for forestry
and forest-based sector. New York, NY: United Nations
Forum on Forests.
Turner, I. M. 1996 Species loss in fragments of tropical rain
forests: a review of the evidence. J. Appl. Ecol. 33,
200–209. (doi:10.2307/2404743)
UNFCCC 2001 The Marrakesh Accords, The Marrakesh
Declaration. Geneva.
UNFCCC 2005a Agenda item 6. Reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing countries: approaches to
stimulate action. In Conf. Parties, 11th Session. Montre ´al.
UNFCCC 2005b Key GHG data. Greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions data for 1990–2003 submitted to the UNFCCC.
Geneva.
White, A. & Martin, A. 2002 Who owns the world’s forests?
Forest tenure and public forests in transition. Washington,
DC: Forest Trends.
1924 J. Ebeling & M. Yasue ´ Realising beneﬁts of avoided deforestation
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2008)